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As defense budgets decline and traditional defense industry suppliers downsize and 
consolidate, many believe that the Department of Defense (DoD) must learn how to do 
business in the commercial marketplace. In fact, commercial industry is leading the pace 
of technological advances in many important areas. Many current and ongoing acquisition 
reform initiatives are geared toward improving the business practices of DoD and 
integrating the commercial and defense sectors of the industrial base. This thesis is an 
examination of one such acquisition reform program. The Air Force's ''Military Products 
From Commercial Production Lines Pilot Program" is demonstrating the feasibility of 
having a commercial firm manufacture military avionics modules. This thesis explores 
existing technical, legal, and cultural barriers to implementing the pilot program, analyzes 
the program's risks and benefits, and makes recommendations for future applications. The 
thesis provides an account of the successes, failures, and lessons learned that may be used 
by program managers at all levels in determining if commercial industry can be a viable 
source of military-unique end-items. 
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The Wright Laboratory Manufacturing Technology Directorate (WL/MT) at 
Wright-Patterson AFB, working with the Avionics Systems Division (ASD) and the 
Automotive Electronics Group (AEG) of TRW Inc., is attempting to demonstrate the 
feasibility of procuring military-unique items manufactured on a commercial production 
line. The objective of the Air Force/TRW program, titled ''Military Products From 
Commercial Lines Pilot," is to demonstrate that a purely commercial firm is capable of 
building military-unique components that meet rigorous military performance standards 
but at a lower cost and with a faster delivery time. This thesis will analyze the program 
and develop lessons learned that can be applied to future acquisitions ofthis nature. 
Tightening budgets and a shrinking defense industrial base have forced the Federal 
Government to pursue sweeping acquisition reforms that are designed to streamline its 
procurement processes. As part of this reform effort, the Department of Defense (DoD) is 
examining "commercialization" initiatives to determine which initiatives are suitable for 
procuring military products. 
TRW AEG currently manufactures electronic products for commercial customers 
in the automotive and heavy construction equipment industries. In the demonstration/pilot 
program, TRW AEG will manufacture avionics modules that will have high-performance 
military capabilities. These modules may later be used in the avionics suites of the Air 
Force's F-22 fighter and the Army's RAH-66 Comanche helicopter. Except for DoD's 
unique reporting and compliance requirements and the project's limited production 
quantities, this project presents no special challenges to TRW AEG. This thesis will study 
the progress of the pilot program, identify its successes and failures, formulate lessons 
learned, and make recommendations for future applications. 
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B. PURPOSE AND BENEFITS OF RESEARCH 
This thesis provides an account of the successes, failures, and lessons learned that 
may be used by program managers at all levels in determining if commercial industry can 
be a viable source of military-unique end-items. Commercial industry is pacing 
technological advances in many important areas, and many believe that DoD must learn 
how to do business in the commercial world. This study is an examination of one of the 
acquisition reform programs that holds great potential for improving procurement 
processes to benefit both the commercial supplier and the Government. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. Primary Research Question 
To what extent is it feasible to obtain military-unique items from a 
commercial production line? 
2. Secondary Research Questions 
a. What is the current philosophy in Government procurement concerning 
commercial practices and procedures? 
b. Is it possible to integrate seamlessly commercial and military processes 
leading to a military acquisition? 
c. What are the barriers to this type of acquisition? 
d. What are the important issues surrounding this type of procurement? 
e. What lessons learned can be gained from the TRW acquisition program? 
f. Should other acquisition programs pursue obtaining military products 
from commercial production lines? 
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D. SCOPE 
This thesis indicates the feasibility of obtaining military products from commercial 
production lines based on the case study of the Air Force pilot program. The study 
identifies existing technical, legal, and cultural barriers to implementing the pilot program, 
analyzes the program's risks and benefits, and makes recommendations for future 
applications. 
This program has received considerable high-level attention from the General 
Accounting Office (GAO) and the Secretary of Defense, and several articles have been 
published describing the program, its goals, and its successes. This thesis will examine the 
program "from the outside" and make an assessment on the future applicability of this type 
of acquisition. 
All recommendations and analyses of risks and benefits are based only on the study 
of this pilot program. The thesis does not explore the results of any other acquisition 
reform pilot program. 
E. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis is a case study with an analysis of the program's feasibility for future 
applications. The research methodology consisted of a literature review, a detailed 
analysis of the pilot program's documentation, and in-depth interviews with 
knowledgeable personnel from the WL/MT program office, the Comanche program office, 
and TRW. 
The background information was developed from a review of the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement 
(DF ARS), appropriate statutes, DoD Directives, research reports and papers, and defense 
related periodicals. The research questions were answered by studying and analyzing the 
program documentation and by conducting personal interviews with experts in the 
program offices. To gain a Government perspective, interviews were conducted with 
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experts from the Government program offices. An industry perspective was gained 
through interviews with TRW representatives. An analysis of these interviews resulted in 
conclusions, lessons learned, and recommendations for future programs. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter II (The Industrial Base and Acquisition Reform) provides an overview of 
the industrial base and acquisition reform efforts designed to integrate commercial and 
military production capabilities. The chapter also identifies the key barriers and risks of 
industrial base integration. 
Chapter III (Case Description: The TRW Industrial Base Pilot) introduces the Air 
Force pilot program by outlining its purpose and intent. The chapter explores specific 
barriers the team has encountered and the changes the team incorporated to overcome the 
barriers. 
Chapter IV (Analysis) identifies the unique aspects that contributed to the IBP's 
success, and analyzes changes the IBP team made to overcome barriers. 
Chapter V (Summary and Recommendations) summarizes the findings ofthe 
research and makes recommendations for future applications. The chapter includes a 
summary of lessons learned which can be applied to the remainder of this program and to 
future acquisitions of this type. Chapter V concludes with a presentation of areas that 
warrant further research and study. 
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ll. THE INDUSTRIAL BASE AND ACQIDSITION REFORM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Dramatic changes in the world threat combined with a declining military budget 
have forced fundamental changes in the way DoD will acquire its weapon systems of the 
future. In the presence of yesterday's Soviet threat, research and development efforts 
focused on defeating a large, highly technical, and militarily capable enemy. In contrast, 
today's threat is uncertain, the enemy is unknown, and research and development efforts 
are traded against legitimate affordability concerns. 
The defense budget outlook has played a key role in forcing DoD to rethink the 
way it procures weapon systems. Since 1985 the total DoD budget has declined by 38%, 
with a 23% decline in Research and Development, Test and Engineering (RDT&E), and a 
70% drop in procurement. (Defense Almanac, 1986-1990; Armed Forces Journal 
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Figure 1: Defense Budget FY80- FYOJ(projected) in FY95 Constant Dollars 
Although the President's budget calls for future increases in the defense budget, 
several independent analyses predict a continuing downward trend. (Banks, 1994; 
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Nordwall, 1995) The declining budget places tremendous pressure on the defense 
acquisition system to find ways to be efficient while still providing the highest quality 
equipment and supplies to US military forces. 
Defense acquisition encompasses a variety of activities. At one end of the 
spectrum, DoD procures relatively small quantities of major weapon systems consisting of 
complex and expensive subsystems. At the other end of the spectrum lies the procurement 
of commercial products where purchases are characterized by large quantities of standard 
items with a relatively low unit cost. Many procurements occur between these two 
extremes with purchases of less costly and less complex components that do not 
necessarily meet the commercial item definition. 
During the Cold War, DoD developed and used the most sophisticated and 
advanced technology in the world while the commercial industry adapted this technology 
for spin-off applications in the commercial marketplace. Today, however, the commercial 
sector is using many advanced technologies long before DoD, and it is DoD looking to 
adapt commercial technologies for insertion into its weapon systems. "Spin-on" 
applications are becoming more and more important in DoD acquisitions. 
Current acquisition reform efforts are focusing on simplifying Government 
procurement processes and reducing the costs associated with weapon system purchases 
by implementing commercial-like practices. By implementing commercial practices, the 
Government may be able to realize some of the efficiencies present in the commercial 
sector and ultimately integrate the commercial and military industrial bases. "Harnessing 
the nation's commercial industrial base to reduce defense costs and keep pace with 
technological advances is one of the key challenges the U.S. military faces over the next 
decade." (Morrocco, 1995) The remainder of this chapter will focus on the industrial base 
and dual-use technology, current acquisition reform efforts aimed at integrating the 
commercial and military sectors of the industrial base, and barriers and risks associated 
with this integration. 
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B. THE INDUSTRIAL BASE AND DUAL-USE TECHNOLOGY 
1. The Industrial Base 
The industrial base consists of the prime contractors and multiple tiers of 
subcontractors that can develop and build defense weapon systems. Recently, many major 
defense contractors have merged, and others have focused their efforts away from the 
defense industry due in part to the declining business base. Defense contractors have 
experienced the same downsizing pressures that the Government and military have 
endured throughout the past several years. 
Defense products are designed and built primarily in defense-specific plants or in 
isolated divisions oflarger corporations. Commercial companies or divisions are often 
segregated into non-defense projects even when working with similar technologies. In 
fact, commercial companies often segregate themselves from their defense counterparts to 
avoid the requirements unique to Government contracting. Commercial companies simply 
cannot afford to change their practices to comply with Government requirements. 
Changing practices would often mean sacrificing their competitive position in the 
commercial marketplace. 
Is the industrial base in trouble? According to a report from the Center for 
Strategic & International Studies CSIS, ''the U.S. defense industrial base is devolving into 
a small, highly specialized, highly subsidized, defense-unique sector that may soon be 
incapable of meeting the nation's fundamental security requirements: quantities of 
affordable equipment, access to - and rapid fielding of- cutting-edge technologies, and 
the ability to expand selected production significantly when crisis conditions warrant." 
(Bingaman, 1991, p. x) An industrial base that is healthy and stable and that can rapidly 
produce defense systems is essential to national security. 
This segregated industrial base was acceptable when the defense budget was 
growing and the defense industry had plenty ofbusiness. Today, however, a segregated 
industrial base is inefficient, costly, and could result in decreased national security. The 
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CSIS report identified some of the possible consequences of continued segregation of the 
commercial and defense industries: 
• Lower production volume resulting in higher unit costs. 
• Limited capability for production surge resulting in greater reliance on foreign 
sources. 
• Lack of access to state-of-the-art commercial processes and products. 
• Inefficient split ofthe national pool of human talent. 
As the budget declines, affordability of future systems is becoming more and more 
important, and the "performance at all cost" mentality is falling by the wayside. The 
budget simply cannot continue to support the defense-unique industrial base. With smaller 
procurements, DoD business alone is not sufficient to keep many defense-unique suppliers 
in business. 
The military, once a major developer and consumer of state-of-the-art 
technologies, is more often just another consumer today. The semiconductor market 
illustrates this shift. In 1965, DoD accounted for over 75% ofUS semiconductor 
purchases. In contrast, DoD purchases now account for only 1% of US company 
semiconductor sales. (Heberling, 1996) 
Furthermore, DoD no longer leads private industry in RDT&E (explain) 
investment in many defense-critical technologies. For DoD to have access to state-of-the-
art technology, it must buy from the commercial industry in many of these critical areas. 
In the electronics industry, for example, commercial industry driven by the competitive 
demands of the marketplace dramatically outspends DoD. In this critical area, commercial 
technological advances outpace gains achieved in DoD research and development 
programs. (U.S. Department ofDefense, 1996, 3) 
Products developed for military use generally cost more than their comparable 
commercial counterparts, due partly to the fact that DoD needs commodities in smaller 
quantities and usually with highly-specialized capabilities. Conversely, commercial 
manufacturers realize economies of scale through mass production, and rely on market 
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forces to improve competition. In the commercial marketplace, the market rewards the 
innovative manufacturer who efficiently makes quality products. 
As the defense budget shrinks, so will the military industrial base. Many 
Congressional leaders now believe that "research, development, and procurement policies 
that emphasize commercial and military integration are the best way to meet both 
economic and defense challenges." (U.S. Congress. House, 1994, 24) The benefits of 
integrating commercial and military production bases include a wider base (commercial 
and military combined) that will better serve surge requirements. (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 1996, 3) 
2. Dual-Use Technology- The Application 
Dual-use technology is defined simply as an application that has both military and 
commercial uses. The technology can result from a military development and "spin-off' 
for use in the commercial sector, or result from a commercial development and "spin-on" 
to a military application. The primary focus ofDoD dual-use technology efforts thus far 
seems to be in adapting military technologies for commercial use - the "spin-off' 
applications. 
Numerous successful "spin-off' applications highlight the potential value ofthese 
technology transfer efforts. For example, the Hughes Electronics division of General 
Motors makes military night vision equipment, and the company has recently developed 
versions for commercial use. Hughes also manufactures heads-up-displays for military 
aircraft and is undergoing an effort to convert this technology for use in automobiles. 
Rockwell International is marketing Global Positioning System (GPS) technology for use 
in commercial automobiles and in mass transit systems throughout the world. (Chatman, 
1996) 
"Spin-on" applications also hold great potential for helping to form an integrated 
industrial base. Recent acquisition reform initiatives designed to promote the use of 
commercial products, practices, and processes illustrate some important aspects of 
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"spin-on" technology transfer. The Collins Avionics & Communications Division of 
Rockwell International manufactures the AN/ARC-210(V) Radio Set for use in Navy, Air · 
Force, and Army aircraft. The Government/industry team developed an acquisition 
strategy that would allow insertion of commercial technology into the design of the radio 
while focusing primarily on performance and reliability. According to the Government 
project office, this effort resulted in an initial cost savings and reduced the threat of 
equipment obsolescence. 
3. Dual Use Technology- The Strategy 
DoD's strategy for maintaining technological superiority with an ever shrinking 
budget focuses on the commercial sector to "reduce costs, shorten acquisition cycle times 
and obtain technologically advanced defense equipment." (Kaminski, 1995) To execute 
this strategy, DoD plans to use a combination of acquisition reform initiatives coupled 
with investment in critical technologies to "break down the barriers between commercial 
and defense industries." This dual-use strategy consists of"three pillars" based on a 
foundation of acquisition reform. (Kaminski, 1995) 
a) First Pillar: Investment in R&D on Dual-Use Technologies 
To maintain technological superiority and to ensure long-term national 
security, DoD plans to invest in technologies that are critical to military requirements, 
need Government action, and provide a significant opportunity for leveraging commercial 
capability. These technologies are beyond state-of-the-art and are not receiving 
commercial investment interest due to the level of risk involved. Yet these technologies 
offer significant payoffs in national security and promise to lead to a viable, self-sustaining 
commercial industrial base. Examples include investments in electronics manufacturing 
technology, flat-panel displays, microelectromechanical systems, advanced aircraft 
composites, and wireless communications. 
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b) Second Pillar: Integration of Military into Commercial 
Production 
Building military products on commercial production lines is a strategy 
intended to share fixed infrastructure costs and take advantage of the efficiencies of 
"cost-conscious, market-driven commercial practices." DoD will be able to share in the 
benefits of economies-of-scale since commercial manufacturers often build in much higher 
volumes than defense manufacturers. In low-volume production runs, DoD can also 
benefit from "economies of scope" (repetition of process across a family oflower-volume 
products). 
c) Third Pillar: Insertion of Commercial Capabilities Into Military 
Systems 
By inserting the best commercial capabilities, materials, products, and 
processes into military systems, DoD can ultimately realize faster implementation of 
leading-edge technology at a much lower overall price. Commercial industry is capable of 
developing and building highly-reliable components and subsystems that can be inserted 
into military systems. Commercial developments also reach the marketplace much sooner 
than typical defense-unique developments. While the commercial computer and 
electronics industry introduces a "next generation" microprocessor every three to four 
years, it often takes DoD longer than ten years to upgrade its technologies. 
d) The Foundation: Acquisition Reform 
Many studies have identified that DoD pays a premium over the 
commercial cost to building similar products. These studies pointed to regulatory controls 
and statutory barriers as the primary reasons for this cost premium. (Coopers & Lybrand, 
1994) One objective of acquisition reform initiativ~s is to integrate commercial and 
military industrial bases to minimize costs and improve efficiency. Current acquisition 
reform initiatives are designed to make the DoD acquisition process more 
"commercial-like" and "wherever possible eliminate those unique contracting, technical, 
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and accounting requirements that form a barrier to greater military/commercial 
integration." (Kaminski, 1995) 
C. ACQUISITION REFORM 
For years, acquisition reform initiatives have focused on streamlining the 
acquisition process, making the Government more like a large commercial consumer of 
goods and services. Since the 1950s, the Congress and the President have chartered 
various commissions to recommend changes to reengineer the Government's acquisition 
process. 
One of the most significant acquisition reform efforts, from the perspective of this 
thesis, occurred in 1986 when amendments to the DoD appropriation bill created statutory 
preference for the purchase of non-developmental items or commercial products. These 
amendments directed DoD to use functional specifications that could be met by. 
commercial products wherever possible, and required DoD to identify statutes and 
regulations that continued to serve as impediments to acquisition of commercial products. 
In response to the 1986 reform effort, DoD developed a simplified uniform contract for 
the purchase of commercial items. (Levin, 1994, 8-10) 
Other acquisition reform initiatives have followed, most notably the Federal 
Acquisition Streamlining Act of 1994 (FASA), and the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 
1996 (FARA). 
1. Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act 
Section 800 ofthe FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act required the 
Under Secretary ofDefense for Acquisition to appoint an advisory panel of Government 
and private sector experts to review all laws affecting DoD procurement. The panel, 
commonly known as the "Section 800 Panel," was to examine these laws with an intent to 
" ... streamline the defense acquisition process ... " and to make recommendations to 
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Congress to eliminate unnecessary laws while ensuring the " ... financial and ethical 
integrity of defense acquisition programs" and to "protect the best interests of DoD." 
(U.S Department ofDefense, 1993, 4) 
The Section 800 Panel recognized that an important element in maintaining the 
industrial base was to integrate the capabilities of the commercial base and those of the 
military base. The panel suggested that in order to bring this integration about the 
Government must adopt commercial contracting practices that would allow suppliers to 
use the same facilities to design and manufacture products for military and commercial 
products. However, this integration remains an unrealized goal today. 
In 1993, the Section 800 Panel produced an 1800 page document that 
recommended sweeping changes to DoD's acquisition processes and ultimately resulted in 
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) of 1994. (U.S. Department ofDefense, 
1993) The Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act implemented many ofthe Section 800 
Panel's recommendations. Of particular importance in the scope ofthis thesis are reforms 
geared toward the purchase of commercial items. 
F ASA creates a statutory preference for commercial items that requires contract 
provisions and market research to facilitate their use "to the maximum extent." The law 
also requires "elimination of contractual requirements that impede acquisition of 
commercial items." A succinct summary ofthe "commercial item" definition outlined in 
FAR Part 2 is as follows: 
• Products of a type customarily used by the general public that have been 
offered for sale in the commercial marketplace. 
• Products that have evolved from existing commercial products through 
advances in technology or performance, even if not yet available in the 
commercial marketplace, as long as the product will be available in the 
commercial marketplace in time to satisfy the federal Government's 
delivery requirements; 
• Commercial products with minor modifications to meet federal 
Government requirements; 
• Commercial products with modifications of a type customarily available 
in the commercial marketplace; 
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• Installation, maintenance, repair, and training services, if procured in 
support of a commercial product under terms and conditions available 
to the general public; 
• Commercial services offered and sold competitively, in substantial 
quantities, in the commercial marketplace, based on established 
catalogue prices for specific tasks performed under standard commercial 
terms and conditions; and 
• Non-developmental items (i.e., items previously developed for 
Government rather that commercial use) if ( 1) the product was 
developed exclusively at private expense; and (2) the product has been 
sold in substantial quantities, on a competitive basis, to multiple state 
and local Governments. (Lumer, 1994} 
New DoD regulations echo the statutory preference for commercial items and 
indicate their importance to the industrial base: 
Historically, DoD has relied on segments ofthe U.S. technology and 
industrial base principally dedicated to supporting DoD requirements. 
Integrating a constricting industrial base and a fast-paced technology sector 
mandates that DoD fully implement the statutory preference for the 
acquisition of commercial items by federal agencies. Acquisition of 
commercial items, components, processes, and practices provides rapid and 
affordable application of these technologies to validated, DoD mission 
needs. (U.S Department ofDefense, 1996, DoD Regulation 5000.1, 3) 
To simplify the acquisition process, DoD can purchase a "commercial item" to 
meet its requirements. Commercial items are exempt from many of the normal legal 
requirements surrounding Government procurement. Commercial item exemptions reduce 
impediments to their purchase by removing the paperwork, record keeping, and 
certification requirements that are unique to Government purchases and have no 
counterpart in the commercial sector. 
2. Federal Acquisition Reform Act 
Acquisition reform was also incorporated into the National Defense Authorization 
Act for Fiscal Year 1996. The Act, referred to as the Federal Acquisition Reform Act of 
1996 (F ARA) expanded the Truth In Negotiations Act (TINA) exception for all 
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commercial contracts, subcontracts, or modifications of contracts or subcontracts. The 
new law also exempts commercial item contracts from the application of the cost 
accounting standards. (Krekorian, April 1996) 
. F ARA requires contracting officers to seek price information to determine price 
reasonableness rather than detailed cost or pricing data when commercial items are 
obtained through an exception to full and open competition. Contracting officers must 
limit requests for information to data regularly maintained by the contractor in its 
commercial operations. It is important to note that the information provided by the 
contractor is subject to audit for a two-year period after contract award. F ARA also 
replaces the current $1 00,000 simple acquisition threshold for civilian agencies and the 
temporary $500,000 DoD threshold with a permanent $500,000 applicable to all agencies. 
(As of the completion date of this thesis, the provisions ofFARA had not been 
implemented in the FAR.) 
3. Commercial Item Acquisition 
One of the main thrusts of the recent acquisition reform initiatives was to improve 
access to the commercial marketplace by making it easier for DoD to purchase 
commercial items. Although F ASA and F ARA streamlined significantly the commercial 
item acquisition process, Government procurement professionals must still follow rigorous 
procedures to buy in the commercial marketplace. Figure 2 is an illustration of these 
procedures. 
Every acquisition begins with the requiring agency's determination of its need. To 
facilitate commercial item acquisition, the requirements must be flexible and the FAR 
requires that they be stated in terms of functions to be performed, performance required, 
or essential physical characteristics. (Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 11.001) 
Through in-depth market research, the agency must determine to what extent commercial 
items or modified commercial items will meet its requirement. (Federal Acquisition 
Regulation, Part 10.002) To gain an understanding of the commercial practices applicable 
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to the acquisition, the agency's market research should include commercial production 
processes, commercial contracting procedures, and commercial contract terms and 
conditions. Once an agency determines that a commercial item can meet its requirement, 
the agency can conduct an acquisition in accordance with FAR Part 12. 





* > $500,000 
Sealed Bid 
Determination 
Figure 2: Commercial Item Acquisition Flow Diagram 
Determining that the price of a commercial item is "fair and reasonable" is the next 
challenge faced in a commercial item acquisition. If the agency can conduct a sealed bid 
solicitation, "price reasonableness" can be assumed as a result of the requirement for 
competition. However, if the agency seeks competitive proposals it must use the 
procedures in FAR Part 15 to determine "price reasonableness." According to FAR Part 
15, contracting officers shall not obtain more information than is necessary, and they 
should seek cost and pricing data only as a last resort. (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 
Part 15.802) This requires contracting officers to use various "price analysis" techniques 
to determine "price reasonableness" of commercial items. Only if they are unable to 
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determine whether the price is fair and reasonable, may contracting officers seek cost and 
pricing data for commercial item acquisitions. 
D. BARRIERS TO INTEGRATION 
DoD's acquisition process must strike a delicate balance between competing and 
often conflicting interests. The objective of any procurement system is to obtain the best 
products, in the most efficient manner possible, and at the least cost. The DoD 
procurement system is no different in this respect. However, DoD must also comply with 
a myriad of special laws and provisions designed to implement some aspect of national 
social policy. The goals of efficient procurement are often in direct conflict with these 
social policy requirements. 
Partly as a result of the Government's complex procurement practices, commercial 
suppliers are often unwilling or unable to do business with the Government. Additionally, 
Government buyers cite many reasons why the commercial industry cannot adequately 
provide military hardware. The result is that commercial companies still face many 
inhibitors to successfully building military products. These inhibitors include technical 
barriers, legal and regulatory requirements, and the culture of the DoD acquisition 
environment. 
1. Technical Barriers 
Technical impediments to integrating the commercial and military sectors of the 
industrial base are rooted in differences between defense and commercial products ap.d 
differences between defense an commercial processes. 
a) The Products 
In many cases, commercial technologies simply do not meet the 
requirements of a military application. Some military products do not have a commercial 
counterpart, as is the case with a fighter aircraft, a tank, or a submarine. 
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Standardization is another barrier that limits commercial technology 
utilization. DoD requires uniformity and consistency in order to facilitate training and 
maintenance, and to minimize operations and support costs. Without this standardization, 
maintenance is difficult, training is nearly impossible, and logistics costs will skyrocket. 
Some military systems may require a greater degree of reliability or 
performance than is provided by a commercial product. Military applications may be 
required to operate in a harsher environment, subject to more adverse conditions than 
those for which a commercial item was originally developed. As another example, the 
state-of-the-art for the commercial technology may fall well short of the performance 
requirements of the military application. 
In special cases, DoD projects may include classified information and have 
special access requirements that are inconsistent with commercial industry and commercial 
buying practices. (U.S. Department ofDefense, 1993, 14) 
b) The Processes 
Defense manufacturing processes are often quite different from processes 
common in the commercial manufacturing industry. Defense industry processes are often 
low-volume and labor-intensive where designers emphasize the performance and 
"form-fit-function" aspects ofthe product. In sharp contrast, typical commercial 
manufacturing processes are developed to yield high-volume production runs. In the 
commercial sector, manufacturing processes often dictate many ofthe key design 
parameters of a product. Although performance is always an important consideration, a 
primary concern for a commercial firm is to design the product for producibility on a 
highly-automated, high-volume production line. 
Producibility is essentially a measure of "how easy" an item is to 
manufacture. Designing for producibility requires manufacturers to match product 
requirements (e.g., performance, form-fit-function, materials) with manufacturing 
processes. DoD defines producibility as: 
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• A design accomplishment that enables manufacturing to repeatedly 
fabricate hardware that satisfies functional and physical objectives at an 
optimum cost. 
• The relative ease of producing an item or system governed by the 
characteristics and features of a design that enables economical 
fabrication, assembly, inspection and testing using available production 
technology. (U.S. Department ofDefense, 1992, The Program 
Manager's Notebook, 4.17-1) 
2. Legal and Regulatory Requirements 
The Federal Government seeks to ensure that it pays a fair price for the goods and 
services it purchases. As a result of frequent cost overruns on many DoD programs, 
Congress has implemented many controls on the procurement process. The resulting legal 
and regulatory requirements of Government contracting are found in various statutes, the 
FAR, and the DFARS. The requirements generally found to serve as the most significant 
inhibitors to implementing commercial practices and to integrating the industrial base 
include TINA, Cost Accounting Standards (CAS), socioeconomic provisions, the quantity 
and uniqueness of Government contract clauses, Government audit rights, and data rights 
issues. (Bingaman 1991; U.S. Department ofDefense, 1992, Commercial practices) 
a) Truth in Negotiations Act (TINA) 
In 1962, Congress passed the Truth in Negotiations Act which ensured that 
DoD had access to cost and ·pricing data that the contractor certified was current, 
accurate, and complete. TINA was implemented to ensure that the Government 
purchased supplies and services from responsible sources at fair and reasonable prices. 
Analysis of a company's cost or pricing data is a measure designed to establish the 
reasonableness of the offered prices. 
TINA and the subsequent implementing provisions in the FAR provide 
exceptions for items for which price reasonableness can be determined based on adequate 
price competition, established catalog or market price, or prices set by law or regulation. 
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(Federal Acquisition Regulation, 1996, Part 15.804-1(a)(1)) The FAR also provides an 
additional exemption specifically for commercial items for which price reasonableness is 
not based on any of the aforementioned factors. The contracting officer may still exempt a 
commercial item contract from cost or pricing data requirements if the contracting officer 
can determine that the price is fair and reasonable through an evaluation of "information 
on prices at which the same or similar items have been sold in the commercial market, that 
is adequate for evaluating, through price analysis, the reasonableness of the price of the 
action." (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 1996, Part 15.804-5(b)(1)) In exceptional 
cases, the Head of the Contracting Agency (RCA) can waive the requirement for 
certification of cost or pricing data if " ... another exception does not apply but the price 
can be determined to be fair and reasonable without submission of cost or pricing data." 
(Federal Acquisition Regulation, 1996, Part 15.801-1 (b)( 5)) 
Although TINA specifically provided exemptions for most commercial 
items and for all contracts less than $500,000, it still served as a significant deterrent to 
commercial companies contemplating Government business. Commercial companies have 
often cited the Government's demands for certified cost data as a major deterrent to 
entering into a contract with the Government. (Bingaman, 1991, 34~ U.S. Department of 
Defense, Defense Systems Management College, 1992, Commercial Practices for 
Defense Acquisition Guidebook, page A-7) 
b) Cost Accounting Standards 
Because the Government wants to account accurately for costs on a 
program, many believe that contractors must comply with a set of standard accounting 
principles. Admiral Hyman Rick over, an advocate of this type of standard accounting 
system, stated in 1968, ''without uniform standards of accounting, the Government [has] 
no measurement to identify costs adequately." (Bingaman, 1991, 30) The resulting 
Government cost accounting standards define exactly how a contractor will maintain 
records and account for costs. 
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In contrast, commercial firms must only comply with Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP) and the tax laws. Commercial firms do not have to track 
costs contract-by-contract as the Government demands. Government contracting imposes 
heavy paperwork requirements, administrative expenses, and the liability ofbeing held 
responsible for not complying with one or more of these Government requirements. 
Many commercial firms will simply refuse to do business with DoD as a result. 
c) Socioeconomic Requirements 
Government contracting is subject to a wide variety of socioeconomic 
requirements designed to ensure that the Government's money is spent in an equitable 
manner. Commercial firms often cite these requirements as a barrier to conducting 
business with the Government. A few examples of current socioeconomic requirements 
include: 
• Utilization of Small Business Concerns 
• Utilization ofWomen-Owned Small Business 
• Utilization ofLabor Surplus Area Concerns 
• Affirmative Action For Special Disabled and Vietnam Era Veterans 
• Affirmative Action For Handicapped Workers 
d) Contract Clauses 
Government contract clauses are often cited as a significant barrier. 
Government contracts include a multitude of clauses, many of which are 
Government-unique, designed to address very specific areas. Many ofthese contract 
clauses appear in subcontracts either because laws and regulations require it, or because 
the prime contractor desires to guard against possible contract non-compliance. In either 
case, subcontractors are often subject to a wide variety of"flow-down" contract 
provisions that may discourage them from entering into the contract. Cost or pricing data 
requirements often flow down from the prime contractor to its suppliers, even if the 
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supplier is providing a commercial product, because the prime contractor typically seeks 
to protect itself in the event of an audit. (Bingaman, 1991, 36-3 7) Additionally, prime 
contractors may still want to flow-down termination clauses in the event the Government 
terminates the contract. This is true even for commercial item contracts. 
e) Audit Requirements 
Government oversight serves as a significant barrier to commercial 
companies seeking a Government contract. The Government may inspect a contractor's 
internal records at the Government's discretion, a practice which is foreign in the 
commercial world. A commercial firm would not allow its customers to audit its internal 
records. (U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Systems Management College, 1992, p. 
A-ll) 
f) Data Rights 
Commercial companies are often unwilling to accept Government .contracts 
due to the data rights clause. Additionally, contractors have been known to hold back 
their most advanced technology in defense contracts in protest ofDoD insistence on data 
rights. (Bingaman, 1991, 57) 
Contractors must decide if releasing data rights to a proprietary 
technology, process, or capability will jeopardize their competitive position in the 
marketplace. A commercial counterpart to the data rights clause present in Government 
contracts does not exist. 
3. Culture 
T echnicallimitations, laws, and regulations do not encompass all of the barriers 
inhibiting commercial technology integration. Attitudes of people and differing business 
practices are also major impediments. These cultural differences between the defense and 
commercial sectors create a significant barrier to incorporating commercial technology 
into defense systems. 
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The attitudes of the people involved in the procurement process create a significant 
barrier to commercial technology integration since "many in the defense acquisition 
business have grown very accustomed to the cold war way of doing business." (Krekorian, 
March 1996) 
Requirements developers typically tend to structure system requirements around 
the ''worst case" scenario and build in excessive performance capabilities to ensure mission 
success in all possible environments. (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1992, 44) 
Engineers may tend to over-design a system to provide a margin of performance safety. 
This emphasis on performance typically requires an exceptional level of effort and often 
excludes technologies known and utilized in the commercial marketplace. 
Another cultural barrier is created when an adversarial relationship exists between 
the Government and the contractor. Government officials are chartered to monitor, audit, 
and correct deficiencies in contract performance, and they often assume the role of a 
watchdog. Contracting officers often view detailed cost analysis and careful monitoring as 
the only way to ensure that the Government "gets what it pays for." They view 
monitoring as a key element in protecting the public interest. Contractors, on the other 
hand, view this monitoring as intrusive and detrimental to their ability to conduct business 
efficiently. In some cases, however, contractors without sufficient oversight have taken 
advantage of the Government. Integrating commercial technology into defense systems 
will require elimination of this seemingly inherent adversarial relationship. 
E. SUMMARY 
Dramatic changes in the world threat combined with the deeply declining defense 
budget have forced planners to rethink the way DoD procures its weapon systems. 
Mergers and acquisitions are commonplace among defense contractors as they face the 
pressures of the defense draw-down. Many acquisition professionals believe that DoD 
must rely on segments of the commercial industrial base to provide a significant portion of 
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DoD's supplies and services. Advocates of this position believe DoD must seek to 
integrate the commercial and military industrial bases. 
Acquisition reform initiatives have focused on making it easier for DoD to procure 
supplies and services by reducing the legal and regulatory requirements. Making it easier 
to tap the commercial market is an important step toward integrating the commercial and 
military sectors of the industrial base. However, barriers to this integration remain, and 
integration may impose additional risk considerations for program managers. The next 
chapter examines a specific example of an attempt to demonstrate industrial base 
integration. 
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ill. CASE DESCRIPTION: THE "MILITARY PRODUCTS FROM 
COMMERCIAL LINES" INDUSTRIAL-BASE PILOT (ffiP) 
A. DESCRIPTION 
The ''Military Products From Commercial Lines" program was initiated as a result 
of an Air Force study that identified the need to integrate the capabilities of the military 
and commercial industrial bases. (Kinsella and Heberling, 1996) In 1993, the U.S. Air 
Force's Wright Laboratory issued a Broad Agency Announcement (BAA) soliciting 
proposals that addressed the concerns of this study. In response to the BAA, TRW ASD 
proposed subcontracting to a commercial firm (TRW AEG) as a method to demonstrate 
dual-use production. In this proposal, the commercial firm would produce avionics 
modules for possible use in the Air Force's F-22 fighter and the Army's RAH-66 
Comanche helicopter. TRW's proposal required redesign of the existing modules to 
facilitate manufacture on TRW AEG's highly-automated commercial production line. 
WL/MT refers to this demonstration effort as the ''Military Products From Comniercial 
Lines Industrial Base Pilot." 
The F-22 avionics suite consists of38 separate but fully integrated modules. For 
the ffiP, TRW AEG will manufacture two of these modules, the RF Front End Controller 
Module (FEC) and the Pulse Narrowband Processor (PNP), to demonstrate dual-use 
production capability. According to a TRW engineer, the ffiP modules are 
"representative of typical digital modules used in defense applications ... (in terms 
of) ... complexity and function." 
Although TRW ASD will develop and manufacture the avionics suites for F-22 
and Comanche, these contracts are completely separate from the ffiP contract. Figure 3 
illustrates these contractual relationships. 
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Figure 3: Contractual relationships for F-22, Comanche, and IBP avionics modules. 
TRW ASD has extensive experience in developing and manufacturing military 
avionics and electronic components. In addition to the IBP and the integrated 
communication, navigation, and identification avionics suites for the F-22 and Comanche, 
TRW ASD manufactures Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs), signal intelligence systems, 
and tactical communications systems for DoD. 
TRW AEGis a purely-commercial sister division of ASD. AEG manufactures 
electronic systems and components for all major vehicle manufacturers worldwide. 
AEG' s products include crash sensors, air bag diagnostic modules, remote keyless entry 
systems, and other electronic and electromechanical products for the automotive industry. 
According to the WL/MT program manager, TRW AEG was selected as the 
subcontractor " ... because its primary products ( airbag sensor modules and diesel engine 
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control modules) are safety critical and have technology similarities to the demonstration 
avionics modules of the pilot." (Kinsella and Heberling, 1996.) 
TRW ASD assembles electronic modules mostly by hand and uses military 
specification (MIL-SPEC) parts for production. Many of these parts include MIL-SPEC 
ceramic packaging for protection against adverse environmental conditions. In contrast, 
AEG's production and assembly lines are highly automated. The ffiP modules are 
manufactured using best commercial practices and commercial components to include 
Plastic Encapsulated Microcircuits (PEMs) and plastic Ball Grid Array (BGA) packaging. 
B. OBJECTIVES 
The ffiP program manager's vision is to demonstrate "seamless integration of 
commercial and military processes leading to a military acquisition" by applying 
commercial principles and commercial manufacturing processes to build military electronic 
modules. The objectives of the program are to: 
(I) demonstrate the commercial manufacture of military electronic modules at a 
lower cost with equal performance and with equal or better quality; 
(2) identify best practices that benefit and barriers that limit the program; 
(3) transfer findings, lessons learned, and recommendations to industry and 
Government. (U.S General Accounting Office, 1996; Kinsella and Heberling, 
1996) 
According to the ffiP program manager, lessons learned from this program must 
be available for Government and industry implementation without using contract-specific 
provisions or one-time waivers. This program must" ... identify barriers and then develop 




The IBP team developed measurements of key success criteria that supported the 
objectives of the program. These metrics were categorized into technical performance, 
price/profit optimization, and transfer. (Kinsella and Heberling, 1996) 
1. Technical Performance 
The IBP modules must achieve the same form, fit, and function characteristics as 
their military counterparts, and they must meet or exceed the same quality and reliability 
standards. Thus far in the demonstration, the modules have met or exceeded the 
requirements, and it appears technically feasible to manufacture them on a commercial 
production line. 
2. Price/Profit Optimization 
To be successful, the demonstration program must achieve the desired cost savings 
for the Government and meet the profit requirements of the commercial manufacturer. 
For the Government, the price of the IBP modules must be 30-50% lower than the 
baseline price of their military counterpart. For TRW AEG, the program must return a 
profit that is consistent with those earned in its existing business. 
a) Government Cost Savings 
The IBP team first used a price analysis approach by comparing the IBP 
price to the cost ofbuilding the modules as-is for the F-22. The price of the F-22 module 
is based on the use of TRW ASD's facility and processes, and Mll.,-SPECs for design and 
fabrication of modules. The IBP price assumes the use ofTRW AEG's facility and 
processes, commercial practices and components, and performance specifications. 
Preliminary analysis suggests that the IBP modules will cost from 53% to 65% less than 
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comparable military modules. (Nanzer, 1996) Figure 4 and Figure 5 reflect this cost 




















Figure 5: Price Analysis - Pulse Na"owband Processor (PNP) 
b) Commercial Firm's Profit Potential 
The IBP team worked hard to convince AEG that embarking on this type 
of production effort would be profitable. When deciding on whether or not to accept a 
project, AEG uses a set of acceptance criteria which focuses on profit For example, AEG 
has a minimum threshold of 18% Return on Assets Employed (ROAE) with a 12% 
minimum in any given year. Using AEG's own proprietary financial analysis model, the 
IBP team demonstrated an average ROAE of 18.5%, and a minimum 13.5%. (Nanzer, 
1996) 
3. Transfer 
The IBP team placed significant emphasis on the ability to transfer« ... concepts, 
practices, and lessons learned ... " to current and future programs. Managers believe that 
29 
the IBP will be most successful if the use of specific statutory waivers or one-time 
exceptions to the rules are not required. 
A recent General Accounting Office (GAO) report recommended that the IBP 
identify Government-unique requirements that are barriers to the IBP's success and then 
seek "Secretary of Defense waivers." The IBP team and other DoD officials disagreed 
with the GAO recommendation because obtaining a waiver" ... would not necessarily 
accomplish the pilot's objective of demonstrating the feasibility of building military 
products on commercial lines in the future." (U.S. General Accounting Office, 1996) 
Quoting a particular section of the DoD response to the GAO recommendation: 
The pilot team has taken the following approach: either the team finds a 
way for DoD prime contractors to subcontract with commercial suppliers 
using existing laws and regulations or the team requests changes to laws 
and regulations. (U.S General Accounting Office, 1996, 17) 
The IBP team is continually assessing business practices and making 
recommendations for adoption both internally and externally. Internal adoption is IBP 
team members' acceptance of the recommendations, while external adoption is the 
program's designated reviewers' (i.e. prime contractors and the DoD program offices) 
acceptance. The IBP will ultimately produce a contractual handbook, a technical 
handbook, and a "model contract" for use in future "military products from commercial 
lines" acquisitions. 
D. BARRIERS TO THE ffiP 
The IBP has so far encountered none of the technical barriers outlined in the 
previous chapter. The IBP avoided these technical barriers by carefully selecting the 
product (electronic modules) to use in the demonstration. The electronic modules 
presented no extraordinary manufacturing challenge to TRW AEG, and rigorous testing 
thus far has validated the reliability and durability of the commercially manufactured parts. 
In contrast, laws and regulations peculiar to Government contracting and the 
conflicting cultures of the defense and commercial industries formed significant barriers to 
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the ffiP. These barriers threatened early the success of the demonstration. This section 
will examine these barriers. 
1. Technical 
A significant challenge to the ffiP was in the original design of the electronic 
modules. The military' design was optimized for manufacture on a typical defense industry 
production line characterized by low-volume, labor-intensive processes. For example, the 
baseline modules incorporated several complex Application Specific Integrated Circuits 
(ASICs) which required hands-on attention throughout the manufacturing and assembly 
process. As a result, the commercial manufacturing firm and its automated processes 
could not readily produce the modules without a significant reengineering effort. 
AEG's manufacturing processes are dramatically different than ASD's. AEG's 
production line is highly automated, uses very little hands-on labor, and is designed for 
high-volume production runs. AEG typically manufactures more items in the course of a 
normal process development to validate the design of a commercial module than they will 
manufacture for the entire ffiP. Because of the relatively high cost of components, AEG 
was unable to discard or scrap parts used in program debug process. Volume proved to 
be a significant challenge, but through the use of AEG's flexible, computer integrated 
manufacturing (Cll\1) capability, the ffiP demonstrated successfully the ability to produce 
small quantities. 
2. Legal/Regulatory 
Commercial firms often indicate an unwillingness to do business with DoD citing 
the difficulty of the process and the cumbersome quantity of legal and regulatory 
requirements. TRW AEG was no different in this respect. Early in the project, AEG 
expressed serious objections to many ofthe legal and regulatory requirements of the 
Government contract. (Nanzer, 1996) 
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By far the most contentious issues to which AEG objected were the requirements 
arising from TINA and CAS. These require companies to track data according to rigid 
guidelines and to differentiate "allowable" costs from "unallowable." 
As a purely commercial firm, AEG had no prior business relationship with the 
Government and therefore did not have a CAS compliant accounting system. AEG' s · 
accounting system was geared to track expenses and revenues according to tax laws, 
GAAP, and not according to the requirements of CAS. AEG did not differentiate 
"allowable" costs from ''unallowable." To become CAS compliant, AEG would have 
incurred significant additional expenses that would have negated much of the cost· savings 
of the program. AEG also believed that the additional expenses and modified accounting 
procedures would have hindered their ability to compete in the commercial market. 
An additional objection to the TINA and CAS requirement stemmed from the 
clauses that would permit the Government to audit AEG' s books and records. AEG 
believed that their detailed cost and pricing data were strictly confidential and any 
disclosure of these data would compromise their competitive advantage. From that 
standpoint, AEG found these requirements totally unacceptable. 
AEG also objected to the data rights provisions in the Government contract. AEG 
prefers to fund all of the development and manufacturing efforts and retain all rights to the 
data. AEG believes that providing these data to the Government may jeopardize its 
competitive position. 
TRW AEG also objected to the socioeconomic provisions in the IBP contract. 
AEG believed that the requirements of most socioeconomic clauses are already imposed 
through public laws or business policies and therefore were unnecessary additions to the 
IBP contract. 
3. Cultural 
Aside from AEG's objections to the legal and regulatory requirements of a 
Government contract, the IBP did not encounter cultural barriers associated with people 
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in the acquisition process. Objectives were stated as performance requirements, and 
engineers worked aggressively to design the modules for manufacture on a commercial 
production line. 
The relationships between WL/MT, TRW ASD, and TRW AEG were not 
adversarial. In fact, all parties were actively engaged in solving problems productively. 
The program effectively used Integrated Product Teams (IPT) and the Integrated Product 
and Process Development (IPPD) process. Managers and employees at all levels were 
fully involved in the direction of the program. 
E. CHANGES MADE TO OVERCOME BARRIERS 
After identifying the barriers ~hat would impede the success of the project, the IBP 
project management team developed strategies to overcome the barriers. The team 
achieved regulatory relief by eventually determining the modules were a "commercial 
item," and by conducting a price analysis of the modules. To overcome cultural barriers, 
the team designed the modules for manufacturability on AEG's highly-automated 
production line and they demonstrated to AEG that this project would financially benefit 
the company in the long-term as well as the short-term. 
1. Technical 
a) Design for Manufacturability (DFM) 
DFM is defined as an approach for designing products so that they can: 
• Be designed in the least time with the least development cost; 
• Make the quickest and smoothest transition to production; 
• Be assembled and tested with the minimum cost and in minimum time; 
• Have the desired level of quality and reliability; 
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• Satisfy customers' needs and compete well in the marketplace. 
(Anderson, 1990, 9) 
The IBP team faced two significant challenges relating to design and 
manufacture of the baseline modules. First, the baseline modules were manufactured with 
parts that had no commercial equivalent, and the IBP team had to demonstrate that PEMs 
would meet the rigorous military requirements for quality, reliability, and durability. 
Second, the team had to overcome difficulties associated with low-volume production 
requirements of the IBP. 
Design engineers had to redesign the F-22 modules for manufacture on 
AEG's automated production line. The newly designed modules take advantage of AEG's 
state-of-the art automation and flexible manufacturing system. The designs incorporate 
standard commercial microcircuits and several ASICs that were also redesigned for the 
automated production line. AEG can now produce the modules without disruption of its 
high-volume commercial business. 
2. Legal/Regulatory 
a) Commercial Item Determination 
Before the passage ofFASA, an early strategy to relieve AEG from the 
legal and regulatory requirements of Government contracting focused on obtaining 
individual exemptions to some of the provisions. In February 1994 the Head of the 
Contracting Agency (HCA) approved an exception to the requirement that AEG submit 
cost and pricing data. However, this exception only applied to labor costs, and AEG was 
still responsible for submitting cost and pricing data for material. ASD remedied this 
situation by offering to purchase the required material and provide it to AEG. Since 
ASD's business is primarily for DoD, the company's accounting systems and business 
practices allowed it to account for costs to the satisfaction of the Government. (Nanzer, 
1996) As a defense subcontractor, however, AEG would still be subject to audits and 
records examination by the Comptroller General. 
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After F AS A, IBP officials recommended an expansion to the commercial 
item definition to specifically include military-unique items manufactured on a commercial 
production line. (Nanzer, 1996) Their justification of this definition stems from the 
"commercial item" definition recommended by the Section 800 Panel. In addition to the 
definition incorporated with F AS A, the Panel recommended a definition that specifically 
included "items produced in response to a Government drawing or specification; provided, 
that the item is purchased from a company or business unit which ordinarily uses customer 
drawings or specifications to produce similar items for the general public using the same 
work force, plant, or equipment." (U.S. Department of Defense, 1993, 15) 
After reviewing this recommendation, the Air Force Materiel Command did 
not consider a broader definition as necessary and therefore did not forward the 
recommendation for legislative change. It was concluded then that the existing F ASA 
definition should be broad enough to define the IBP modules as "commercial items." 
(Nanzer, 1996) IBP modules are like modules AEG produces for its commercial 
customers with " ... modifications of a type customarily available in the commercial 
marketplace." (Federal Acquisition Regulation, 1996, Part 2.101) AEG routinely designs 
and modifies its products to meet its individual customer's needs. The IBP modules 
required modifications of a type that AEG provides for its commercial customers. ASD 
subsequently determined that the subcontract with AEG was for a "commercial item." 
The Wright Labs contracts office endorsed ASD's determination with concurrence from 
the legal office. (Kinsella, 1996, Interview) 
b) Price Analysis 
Commercial item status alone did not relieve AEG of the cost and pricing 
data requirements of TINA and of FAR Part 15. Since F ARA was not yet incorporated 
into the FAR, it was still necessary for ASD to demonstrate to WLIMT that the price of 
the IBP modules was "fair and reasonable" according to the requirements outlined in the 
FAR. 
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As of the completion date of this thesis, ASD's price analysis was ongoing. 
The analysis compared commercially available digital signal processing modules with the 
military-unique modules produced in the IBP. The ASD analyst examined the key price 
drivers commonly associated with this type of hardware. These price drivers include 
functionality, packaging, material content, labor content, sales volume, and warranty 
provisions. (Nanzer, 1996) 
The WL/MT contracting office preferred to base an exception to the cost 
or pricing data requirement on a price analysis of similar items sold in the commercial 
market. (Dillon, 1996) If WL/MT could not find a similar item, it planned to seek a 
waiver to the requirement through the HCA and the "exceptional cases" provision of FAR 
Part 15.804-1(b)(5). Under this provision, ASD's price analysis would help determine 
price reasonableness of the IBP modules. (Dillon, 1996) 
What did the "commercial item" status mean to the IBP? Before the 
commercial item determination, the FAR and the DF ARS required approximately 30 
clauses on the subcontract between ASD and AEG. Included were CAS, Government 
property, TINA, and procurement integrity clauses. Following the commercial item 
determination, the contract required only three clauses: 
• FAR 52.222-26 Equal Opportunity 
• FAR 52.222-35 Affirmative Action for Special Disabled and Vietnam Era 
Veterans 
• FAR 52.222-36 Affirmative Action for Handicapped Workers 
AEG complied with each of the remaining clauses through existing 
business ethics and Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) programs. The resulting 
commercial item subcontract presented no legal and regulatory barriers to doing business 
with the Government. 
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3. Cultural 
The ffiP team quickly discovered that the commercial firm was not eager to accept 
the Government business with all of its unique requirements and complexities. Managers 
had to demonstrate to AEG how this particular defense contract would financially benefit 
the company. This demonstration was referred to as "The Business Case," and was also a 
key success metric as described earlier in this chapter. 
Using AEG's own proprietary financial model, The Business Case demonstrated to 
AEG that the ffiP would provide a satisfactory after-tax profit. The Business Case 
effectively convinced AEG that this particular DoD effort made good business sense for 
the company and AEG eventually accepted the terms of the contract. Without the 
Business Case, it is doubtful that AEG would compete for Government business. The key 
to success was to demonstrate that the ffiP would be profitable. (Nanzer, 1996) 
F. SUMMARY 
The "Military Products From Commercial Lines" ffiP is attempting to demonstrate 
a method of integrating the commercial and defense sectors of the industrial base. Thus 
far, the program has demonstrated that the commercial firm is technically capable of 
producing military products, and preliminary metrics indicate that the program will 
eventually meet its criteria for success. The ffiP team was able to achieve success by 
identifying barriers to the program and by implementing changes to overcome the barriers. 






Thus far, the ffiP has demonstrated that it is indeed feasible for DoD to buy 
military-unique products manufactured on a commercial production line. It appears that 
the commercial producer is technically capable of manufacturing electronic modules that 
meet or exceed military quality and reliability requirements. Extensive testing of module 
prototypes yielded favorable results in these areas. The ffiP also showed dramatic 
potential cost savings to the Government and demonstrated adequate profit potential for 
the commercial firm. This chapter analyzes the program to assess the degree to which it is 
feasible to conduct acquisitions of this type in the future. The analysis will reveal unique 
aspects of the ffiP that helped its success to date, examine the changes made to overcome 
barriers, identify barriers that will continue to exist, and discuss possible future 
implications. The analysis should prove useful to program managers contemplating buying 
military products manufactured on commercial production lines. 
B. UNIQUE ASPECTS OF ffiP 
The Military Products From Commercial Lines Pilot is a unique program in many 
respects. As a leading-edge project attempting to demonstrate one of the potential 
benefits of acquisition reform, the ffiP enjoys several advantages not normally available to 
typical acquisition programs. 
Referring to Figure 3 on page 26, the ffiP project office was established and 
funded specifically to demonstrate the potential of dual-use production. Having its own 
source of money, the ffiP team was dedicated to this specific project, and was able to 
focus its resources to overcome any potential barrier to success. Other programs will not 
have this advantage. If program managers desire to purchase military products from a 
commercial manufacturer, they must dedicate people and money to accomplish the 
acquisition. Typical acquisition programs will probably not have extra money to dedicate 
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to specific projects of this nature, and they will not have the luxury of dedicating a "team" 
to a project that will most likely represent only a small portion of a much larger program. 
Typical program managers must wrestle with a broad range of program-level issues that 
will go beyond the relatively narrow scope of the problems encountered in the IBP. 
However, in the near term, it is possible that program managers can leverage the IBP's 
successes to get their own project started. 
The IBP also benefited from the fact that TRW AEG and TRW ASD are part of 
the larger corporation of TRW Inc. This business relationship perhaps facilitated 
increased cooperation between the divisions. It is conceivable that TRW Inc. used some 
measure of "corporate arm twisting" to ensure the program was a success. The 
possibility of this type of business relationship may be limited in typical acquisition 
_programs. In the absence of this type of business relationship, programs may face 
additional problems and challenges. This suggests that program managers may look for 
opportunities where commercial and military divisions are part of the same corporation 
and where program managers can gain the support of corporate management. 
"Streamlining" and "acquisition reform" are top-level priorities in defense 
procurement. As a result, innovative acquisition reform efforts receive increased attention 
and visibility from their inception. The IBP was just such an acquisition reform effort, 
receiving considerable DoD and GAO attention. This visibility put all of the players 
«under the microscope" and cultivated a climate conducive to success. Everybody was 
under increased pressure to find a way to make this program work. Typical programs 
with less high-level visibility may not be as successful as the IBP. Key participants may 
simply find it easier to take the path of least resistance and continue to operate "the way 
we have always done it." This makes it vital for program managers to "sell" the 
innovative approaches of his/her program aggressively and to demonstrate how the 
program will achieve streamlining goals. 
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C. ANALYSIS OF CHANGES MADE TO OVERCOME BARRIERS 
The ffiP team accomplished several things that enabled its success to date. 
Among these were its efforts to design the modules for manufacture on the commercial 
production line, ASD's determination that the modules were a "commercial item," ASD's 
price analysis to demonstrate the modules' "price reasonableness," and the business case 
analysis to demonstrate that the ffiP would be profitable for the commercial firm. 
1. Technical 
Both commercial and defense manufacturing firms evaluate projects for ease of 
production. The firms conduct "producibility" or ''DFM'' analyses to determine the best 
designs, manufacturing processes, and process controls that will ensure customer 
satisfaction and minimize costs. However, the best designs, processes, and controls for a 
defense manufacturer are often dramatically different than those for a commercial 
manufacturer. Defense manufacturing processes are often low-volume and 
labor-intensive. In contrast, commercial processes are often high-volume and highly 
automated. 
Initially, the ffiP modules were designed for manufacture on TRW ASD's military 
production line. As a result, their design was almost totally incompatible with AEG's 
commercial production line. Redesign of the modules was absolutely critical. TRW AEG 
and most other commercial companies will not modify their processes to manufacture 
defense products, particularly when these requirements are likely to be relatively 
low-volume and will represent only a tiny fraction of their overall business. 
If program managers desire to seek commercial companies to manufacture military 
items, they must be aware of the differences between typical defense production facilities 
and the production lines of commercial firms. Program managers must recognize that it 




a) Commercial Item Determination 
Determining that the IBP modules met the definition of a "commercial 
item" was arguably the most significant enabler for the project. Without commercial item 
determination and the resulting exemptions to the myriad of Government-unique 
contracting requirements, AEG would not have been willing to participate. AEG viewed 
the Government-unique requirements as high-risk threats to their competitiveness in the 
commercial market. In fact, most commercial firms would probably not commit to this 
type of low-volume, high-risk project without significant relief from the 
Government-unique requirements. 
TRW ASD made the determination that the AEG-produced modules were 
commercial items based on their assessment of the "commercial item" definition in the 
FAR. It is important to trace this commercial item determination to 1) see if it in fact fits 
within the FAR definition, and 2) analyze the potential for similar commercial item 
determinations in the future. 
TRW ASD determined that the IBP modules were "of a type customarily 
used for non-Governmental purposes that have been sold to the general public" (emphasis 
added) (Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 2.101) since AEG and other manufacturers 
produce electronic modules for the commercial automotive industry. ASD further 
determined that the modules were to be manufactured with "modifications of a type 
customarily available in the commercial marketplace" (emphasis added) (Federal 
Acquisition Regulation, Part 2.101) since AEG also designs and builds modules to its 
commercial customers' specifications. 
Based on this interpretation of the commercial item definition, one can 
easily define many military-unique products as "commercial items" if manufacturers build 
items "of a type," and make "customary modifications" to commercial customers' 
specifications. Following are several hypothetical examples to illustrate the scope of this 
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interpretation of the definition, and to demonstrate further the thought process used in 
TRW ASD's commercial item determination: 
( 1) File Cabinet. In this example, the Government has a 
requirement for a five-drawer file cabinet but a thorough market survey revealed that 
commercial file cabinet manufacturers only build four-drawer models. If the contracting 
officer finds that the requirement can be met by "a type" (file cabinet) of item sold in the 
commercial marketplace which can be modified to meet the requirement, the procurement 
is for a commercial item. (Gaudio, 1995, 12) 
(2) Application Specific Integrated Circuit (ASIC). ASICs are 
essentially customized circuits that have been designed and manufactured for a particular 
purpose, often for a particular customer. Typical ASICs are readily available in the 
commercial marketplace and manufacturers design and build them to meet commercial 
market demands. According to Chapman, 
The vast majority of ASICs sold into both commercial and 
military/aerospace markets are "premanufactured." "Customization" 
involves only the way in which certain standard functional blocks ... are 
interconnected by deposited and etched layers of metal. In fact, both 
commercial and military/aerospace customers use identical design software 
to develop their "customized" requirements. (Chapman, 1995, 30) 
In this example, a military-specific ASIC could in fact be a 
commercial item if, 1) the contracting officer determines the requirement can be met by "a 
type" of item (ASIC) used primarily for non-governmental purposes that is sold to the 
general public, and, 2) the manufacturer will make "modifications of a type" customarily 
made for his commercial customers. ASIC manufacturers routinely modify their products 
to meet customer requirements. 
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(3) Aircraft Landing Gear. A manufacturer designs and builds 
to customer specifications landing gear for large commercial airplanes. If the Government 
has a requirement for replacement landing gear for the C-17, can this requirement be met 
by a commercial item? Following the earlier thought pattern, yes. 
The Government has identified a requirement for landing gear that 
can be met by an item that is "of a type" used and sold in the commercial marketplace. 
The C-17 landing gear requires "modifications of a type" that are also customarily 
available in the commercial marketplace. The landing gear meets the definition of a 
commercial item. 
The above examples explore only those cases where the 
modifications required are "of a type customarily available in the commercial 
marketplace." An additional opportunity to meet the commercial item definition is with 
"minor" modifications that are not customary in the commercial marketplace. The 
difficulty with using the "minor modification" justification lies in determining exactly what 
constitutes a "minor" modification. The FAR defines minor modifications as those 
" ... that do not significantly alter the non-governmental function or essential physical 
characteristics of an item or component, or change the purpose of a process." (Federal 
Acquisition Regulation, Part 2.101) The FAR further outlines factors to be considered in 
determining whether a modification is "minor." These factors include ''the value and size 
of the modification and the comparative value and size of the final product. Dollar values 
and percentages may be used as guideposts, but are not conclusive evidence that a 
modification is minor." (Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 2.101) The "minor 
modification" definition leaves even more room for varying degrees of interpretation. 
Different people will arrive at different conclusions about whether an item meets the 
commercial item definition based on their interpretation ofwhat constitutes a "minor 
modification." 
F ASA significantly broadened the definition of a commercial item 
and the new definition provides much room for interpretation. The opportunity is 
available to apply the definition liberally or in a conservative manner. This application will 
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depend on many factors to include a person's past experiences, tolerance for risk, and 
willingness to be innovative. Program managers should recognize that different 
interpretations and applications of the commercial item definition could hinder the 
progress of a program. Unless all parties accept a common definition, program managers 
will likely spend a significant amount of time convincing the "unbelievers." 
b) Price Analysis 
Although F ARA exempted commercial items from the cost and pricing 
data requirements of TINA, contracting officers must still determine the price 
reasonableness of commercial items using information other than cost or pricing data. 
Since AEGis a subcontractor to ASD, ASD is conducting a price analysis for the 
Government contracting officer's approval. The Government contracting officer must 
analyze ASD's submission and ultimately determine whether or not the modules' prices 
are fair and reasonable. 
ASD' s price analysis is attempting to demonstrate " ... that the proposed 
price is reasonable in comparison with current or recent prices for the same or similar 
items purchased in comparable quantities ... " (emphasis added). (Federal Acquisition 
Regulation, Part 15.804) This analysis will be extremely difficult since very few (if any) 
commercial modules are as complex as the IBP modules or sold in such small quantities. 
Future programs will likely face similar difficulties. 
"Price analysis" is difficult under ideal circumstances and even more 
difficult for a Government contract. The FAR defines "price analysis" as " ... the process of 
examining and evaluating a proposed price without evaluating its separate cost elements 
and proposed projif' (emphasis added). (Federal Acquisition Regulation, Part 15.801) 
The Government tends to lean to "cost analysis" as the primary means of evaluating the 
price reasonableness of a contractor's proposal. Cost analysis is an 11 ••• evaluation of the 
separate cost elements and proposed profit of an offeror's or contractor's cost or pricing 
data or information other than cost or pricing data ... " (emphasis added) (Federal 
Acquisition Regulation, Part 15.801). 
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Most Government price analysis techniques are based on some sort of 
comparison. Government techniques include comparisons of the proposed price with the 
prices in other proposals (competition), the prices of similar items, the prices published in 
a catalog, or the prices determined by an independent Government cost estimate. (Federal 
Acquisition Regulation, Part 15. 805-2) These comparative methods of price analysis will 
not readily enable Government contracting officers to determine price reasonableness of a 
military unique product manufactured on a commercial production line. The uniqueness 
of the product makes it extremely difficult if not impossible to use effectively these 
comparative techniques. 
3. Cultural 
It is no secret that commercial companies are not ''breaking down DoD's door" 
seeking business. Instead, DoD must seek capable commercial companies and 
demonstrate to them that it is profitable to do business with the Government. The ffiP 
team demonstrated to AEG that this project would be a profitable business venture. 
Without the ffiP team "selling" the project, AEG would not have had an incentive to seek 
the contract. The contract was probably too small (both dollars and volume) for AEG to 
even bother. 
Although AEG may have been subject to some "corporate arm twisting," it is 
unlikely that this will be a factor in "regular" procurements in the future. Simply put, 
corporations will not force their commercial divisions to "play" with the unique aspects of 
a Government contract. Instead, the Government must find a way to encourage 
commercial firms to engage in DoD business. The Government must "sell" the business 
deal to the commercial companies. 
In the ffiP, ASD was the prime contractor who subcontracted with AEG to 
manufacture the modules. ASD actually "sold" the project to AEG by demonstrating the 
project's potential profitability using AEG's own proprietary financial model. It is highly 
unlikely that a prime contractor will have access to a commercial firm's proprietary 
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financial model, making a similar profitability demonstration extremely difficult. Prime 
contractors would most likely avoid this type of subcontracting arrangement since it 
would be difficult to sell, and might even cut into their business. In the case of the IBP, 
AEG's modules could be substitutes for the modules that ASD manufactures. Without the 
specific IBP contract, ASD would most likely bid to build the modules instead of 
subcontract for their manufacture. This is probably true for most prime contractors. For 
the prime contractor, finding a capable commercial manufacturer and "selling" the benefits 
of a potential contract would probably be more trouble than it was worth. Program 
managers must recognize this possibility, develop a business case analysis, and assist prime 
contractors in finding capable commercial manufacturers. 
D. REMAINING BARRIERS 
The existing commercial item definition will continue to be a barrier to using 
commercial technology in the future and to integrating the commercial and military sectors 
of the industrial base. The barrier exists because determining whether an item is truly 
"commercial" according to the definition is difficult and subject to different 
interpretations. In cases where an item is "sold in substantial quantities to the general 
public" and prices are based on "adequate competition," it is clear an item is in fact 
commercial. For example, a computer system available from an electronics retailer, or a 
desk from an office supply store clearly meet the FAR definition. A unique item 
manufactured to unique specifications is subject to widely different interpretations. Some 
will argue that if the item is "of a type customarily used for non-governmental purposes" 
or can be used with "modifications of a type customarily available in the commercial 
marketplace," then the item meets the commercial item definition. Others will argue that 
this ''unique" item is not customarily available and the commercial item definition certainly 
does not and will not ever apply to military-unique items. 
If a product meets the definition of a "commercial item," many requirements of 
Government contracting are eliminated and many of the barriers to. commercial item 
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acquisition are effectively removed. But, it is a common perception that items developed 
using commercial manufacturing processes do not necessarily meet the definition of a 
commercial item. As Heberling stated, " ... due to conflicting interpretations of the 
commercial item definition, many in the procurement community do not view a military 
product as commercial, even if it is made in a purely commercial firm." (Heberling, 1996, 
48) Chapman summarized this perception: 
Some fully customized [integrated circuits] are designed "from the ground 
up" and manufactured for a specific military/aerospace customer for a 
specific program. Devices in this class cannot easily fit even the most 
liberal definition of "commercial item." (Chapman, 1995, 30) 
The application of the commercial item definition is open to varying degrees of 
interpretation and therefore constitutes a continued barrier to more widespread use of 
commercial sector manufacturers. 
DoD's tendency to favor cost analysis over price analysis will continue to be a 
barrier. The Government is very proficient in cost analysis but generally lacks experience 
in price analysis. The Government has a" ... tendency to determine a product's fair price 
by assessing its cost and then adding an arbitrary fixed amount of profit ... " (U.S. 
Department ofDefense. Defense Systems Management College. 1992. Commercial 
Practices For Defense Acquisition Guidebook. p. 2-6) This practice is incompatible with 
the commercial marketplace and commercial firms are simply unwilling to provide DoD 
with the information required to conduct cost analysis. 
Many experts and long-time acquisition professionals believe that the acquisition 
culture is the largest single barrier to reform. Culture will have a significant impact on 
acquisition programs in the future. In general, the DoD culture is characterized by risk 
aversion, and people finding comfort in ''the way we've always done it." Making changes 
in this culture will prove to be a difficult process, but necessary ifDoD wants to integrate 
the industrial base. 
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E. ADDITIONAL IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE 
1. Industrial Base Issues 
Integrating the capabilities of the military and commercial sectors of the industrial 
base is a goal for DoD acquisition. Realization of this goal is intended to streamline 
procurement, making it easier, faster, and cheaper to acquire military products from a 
wider, more capable industrial base. It is possible, however, that "integrating" the 
industrial base may actually reduce the number of firms capable of manufacturing 
highly-technical military products. Integration may ultimately evolve into a "survival of 
the fittest" competition between traditional defense contractors and manufacturers in the 
commercial sector. In this case, military industrial capacity may actually decline. What 
will happen to firms like TRW ASD in the market if firms like TRW AEG can replace 
them? Do we need firms like ASD? These questions and their answers must be 
considered as the Government embarks on reform initiatives designed to enhance the 
acquisition process. 
2. Risk Issues 
Using commercial technologies in military applications is not free of risk. In fact, 
the risks associated with commercial technologies are not markedly different from those 
associated with using technologies developed by a defense contractor. All program 
managers face risks associated with obtaining a product that meets the performance 
requirements, at a particular cost, and within a particular time. Program managers must 
manage the risks that may impact their ability to deliver a product that meets these 
required performance, cost, and schedule objectives. 
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a) Technical Risk 
Technical risks are the risks associated with developing a product to meet 
the performance requirements of the user. In the case of a commercial technology, the 
causes of technical risk include reliability and maintainability. 
b) Reliability 
"Reliability can be defined simply as the probability that a system or 
product will perform in a satisfactory manner for a given period of time when used under 
specified operating conditions." (Blanchard, 1991, 347) In many cases, commercial 
technologies may not be suitable for military applications because the equipment must 
operate in extremely harsh environmental conditions. For example, a commercial 
electronic component may work perfectly under the hood of an automobile, but it may not 
withstand the shock, vibration, and temperatures encountered in a tank engaged in desert 
warfare. 
c) Maintainability 
Maintainability of a component refers to the " ... ease, accuracy, safety, and 
economy in the performance of maintenance actions." (Blanchard, 1991, 389) 
Commercial technologies may not be developed with an emphasis on maintainability. 
Automobiles, computers, television sets, etc., are designed to be repaired by trained 
experts, and even routine maintenance tasks often prove difficult for users. In contrast, 
military users must be able to maintain their equipment easily since any maintenance 
difficulty can be especially disastrous under combat conditions. 
d) Supportability Risk 
Supportability is a measure of the logistical support required to keep an 
operable item in the hands of its users throughout the item's life cycle. Supportability 
concerns include, but are not limited to, configuration control and the requirements for 
spares, test equipment and personnel. 
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In the commercial marketplace, technology and companies come and go 
frequently. If a commercial company manufactures an item using a particular process 
today, there is no guarantee that the company will still manufacture the item tomorrow. 
There is no guarantee the company will still be in business. This places significant risk on 
DoD as a customer, since DoD often buys weapon systems planning on a life cycle of20 
to 30 years or more. DoD may need spares, but firms may no longer manufacture them. 
Greater use of the commercial sector to manufacture military systems 
dictates that DoJ? rethink the way it plans to support those systems. Currently, DoD plans 
for system life-cycles of20 to 30 years or more, but commercial technology evolves at a 
much higher rate. If DoD plans to use more commercial technology in its weapon 
systems, DoD should plan to upgrade at a frequency that takes advantage of frequent 
commercial technological advances. 
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V. SUMMARY, LESSONS LEARNED, & RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. SUMMARY 
The ''Military Products From Commercial Lines Pilot" has thus far demonstrated 
that it is technically feasible for a capable commercial firm to manufacture highly technical 
military components. Even with the notable changes brought about by acquisition reform, 
the demonstration has also identified barriers that not only impeded the IBP, but that will 
stand in the way of any future acquisition program of this type. Ranging from legal and 
regulatory restrictions on the procurement of commercial products to the attitude and 
culture of the acquisition workforce, these barriers form a significant impediment to 
ultimately integrating the industrial base. Eliminating these impediments should be a goal 
of commercial and defense procurement professionals. 
B. LESSONS LEARNED 
• Commercial Item Determination Is Essential. 
Commercial item determination is absolutely critical to future integration efforts. 
A product's status as a "commercial item" eliminates most FAR and DFARS requirements 
that commercial firms find objectionable. Commercial firms are simply not willing to trust 
DoD in an audit and oversight role. 
• Commercial Item Definition Subject To Interpretation. 
It will be difficult for military unique items manufactured by a commercial firm to 
fall under the existing commercial item definition. If the definition does not change to 
address this type of procurement specifically, there will continue to be conflicting 
interpretations of the definition. This will in tum hamper DoD's ability to buy 
military-unique products from commercial manufacturing firms. 
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• Business Case Analysis Is Essential. 
Volume of production remains an important factor in determining if production 
effort will be profitable for businesses to enter the DoD market. DoD is rapidly becoming 
a small customer in terms of volume to many middle-tier technology manufacturers. Many 
of these commercial companies may be unwilling to invest the extra time and money 
dealing with small volume customers like DoD. A business case analysis is vitally 
important in breaking down company's resistance to doing business with DoD. 
Commercial firms are not running to DoD for business - DoD must actively seek them 
and encourage them to participate. DoD must entice them with the right kind of deals by 
understanding what commercial firms need in terms of profit and not in terms of cost plus 
a fee. 
• Volume Lowers Costs. 
From the Government's perspective, volume is the major device for lowering 
prices - higher volume results in a lower price. Volume provides for common designs. 
With common designs, DoD can consider shortening product life, addressing obsolescence 
issues by planning for more frequent upgrades. 
• Flexible Manufacturing Systems Enable Success. 
Flexible manufacturing systems enable commercial firms to manufacture 
economically the relatively small lot sizes generally required for DoD-type business. 
Flexible manufacturing results in higher quality, lower production costs, and higher capital 
utilization for the commercial firm. Commercial manufacturing processes are 
highly-automated, and products made on commercial production lines must be easily 
adaptable to automation. Companies selected must be able to adjust to the relatively small 
lot sizes typical in defense procurements. 
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• Integrate Where It Makes Sense. 
A key element in F ASA is the proposal for greater integration of the commercial 
and defense sectors of the industrial base in areas in which it makes sense. In some areas, 
integration may not make sense. For example, it may not make sense to integrate nuclear 
capability, stealth technology development, or tank, fighter, and submarine development. 
But even in these examples, components of the systems are good candidates for 
integration efforts. 
• Select Quality Suppliers. 
Selection of high quality manufacturers and suppliers is absolutely essential. 
World class manufacturers have been successful in international business which connotes 
market driven quality, cost control, and delivery schedules. World-class manufacturers' 
test standards are often as stringent as defense requirements. 
C. RECOMMENDATIONS 
If DoD is to have access to the latest technologies developed in commercial 
industry, the current acquisition system requires fundamental change. DoD must· change 
the way it develops and manufactures weapon systems and it must eliminate the barriers 
that have been erected between the civilian and defense industries. Many viable sources of 
high technology for defense systems refuse to do business with DoD citing excessive 
regulations, cumbersome processes, and too much oversight. Weapon systems "must be 
consciously designed to use state-of-the art commercial parts and subsystems and to be 
built in facilities with integrated military and commercial production lines." (Kaminski, 
1995) 
Military products from commercial production lines is a step towards integrating 
the commercial and military sectors ofthe industrial base. However, certain changes in 
the defense acquisition system will be required for this integration to occur. Changes are 
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required in procurement laws and regulations, as well as in the culture of our acquisition 
workforce. If these changes are made, DoD will be more able to benefit from 
technological advances in the commercial marketplace. 
1. Required Changes 
IfDoD truly intends to integrate the capabilities of the commercial sector into the 
defense industrial base, the acquisition system requires changes. Unless laws and 
regulations that inhibit commercial participation in Government contracts are changed, it is 
doubtful that meaningful integration of the commercial and military sectors of the 
industrial base will occur. Additionally, acquisition and contracting professionals within 
DoD require training and education, expanding their skills to understand commercial 
practices, processes, capabilities, and limitations. 
a) Legal/regulatory 
The commercial item definition should be expanded to specifically include 
items produced by capable commercial firms. One of the commercial item definitions 
recommended by the Section 800 Panel but not incorporated in F ASA read: "An item 
may be considered to meet [the definition of a commercial item] even though it is 
produced in response to a Government drawing or specification; provided, that the item is 
purchased from a company or business unit which ordinarily uses customer drawings or 
specifications to produce similar items for the general public using the same workforce, 
plant, or equipment." (U.S Department ofDefense, 1993, 15) This definition would 
eliminate the difficulties associated with different interpretations of the existing 
commercial item definition. Under this revised definition, the ffiP electronic modules 
would clearly qualify as commercial items. 
b) Cultural 
A more difficult task is to change the culture of the DoD acquisition 
community. In the face of change, a natural tendency is to revert to doing something the 
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way it has always been done. For example, it will be difficult for Government analysts to 
switch from cost-based analysis to market research and price analysis to determine price 
reasonableness. The Government has grown accustomed to requiring that suppliers 
submit volumes of cost information to justify their prices. Effective price analysis will be 
· much more difficult than detailed cost analysis, especially since Government analysts have 
little experience or training in commercial price analysis techniques. Government efforts 
to change the culture should continue to focus on training and educating the acquisition 
workforce. 
2. Potential Future Applications 
It is clear that the commercial marketplace cannot meet DoD's requirements in all 
cases. Nevertheless, commercial manufacturers are often excellent candidates to produce 
military products. To determine which application might be appropriately manufactured 
by a commercial firm, program managers should focus on the processes and capabilities 
of the commercial manufacturer. In cases where the commercial marketplace dictates the 
pace oftechnology, and where commercial manufacturers produce state-of-the-art 
products using state-of-the-art processes, DoD should consider commercial sources. 
Examples include components manufactured in the commercial electronics industry, and in 
the composites industry. Many electronics and composites manufacturers have complete, 
in-house design and analysis capabilities that can be deployed to benefit their customers' 
needs, whether their customers are commercial or Government. DoD should seek to take 
advantage of these capabilities. 
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE STUDY 
1. Life-Cycle-Cost Analysis 
Conduct a life-cycle-cost analysis of the commercially produced modules and 
compare them with modules designed and produced by a traditional defense manufacturer. 
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A detailed life-cycle-cost analysis will enable program managers to see if commercial 
manufacturing firms can be cost-effective suppliers of military unique products. This 
analysis should consider the potential to upgrade continually the modules with new and 
improved commercial technology. Planning for continual upgrade may reduce the initial 
research, development, and procurement costs by allowing planners to design and build 
components that will be replaced or upgraded relatively early in the life-cycle of the 
weapon system. 
2. Risk Analysis 
Conduct a detailed risk analysis of the IBP, identifying risks and suggesting 
mitigation strategies. Include an assessment of the technical risk associated with using 
PEMs in military applications. Identify tools program mangers can use to improve risk 
assessment of these projects. A risk assessment will provide program managers with 
additional information they need to determine if choosing a commercial manufacturer is a 
good decision. 
3. Price Analysis 
Price analysis is an area in which DoD generally lacks expertise and experience. 
Most detailed analysis focuses on cost and profit data - information which may not be 
available when dealing with a commercial manufacturer. A study should develop strategy 
and recommend policy to conduct price analysis of military-unique products manufactured 
by a commercial company. Large commercial companies like General Motors and 
Caterpillar routinely conduct price analysis to determine price reasonableness. Consider 
their techniques and determine applicability to DoD contracts. 
4. Future Applications 
Identify additional future applications where DoD may benefit from commercial-
military integration. Survey these industries to see which are and which are not engaging 
in Government business. Identify reasons why companies are not participating in DoD 
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business. Several studies in this area have been completed in the past, and a new thesis 
can build on the previous research. 
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